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ESSAY FRANK VAN OORT: Myths and realities

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How to quantify untapped and unused economic potentials in an economy that may be less resilient after the (next) crisis (Beyond Plan B)?

This essay critically discusses four themes that are increasingly important for local economic development strategies in a globalising and restructuring urban world: (1) agglomeration, urban networks and corridors, (2) clusters and urban specializations, (3) regional competitiveness, and (4) diversifying urban skill economies.

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DOWNLOAD: Beyond Plan B Workbooks I - V

Download all Workbooks

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Available for download now, all Beyond Plan B Workbooks!

We are pleased to present to you the five Beyond Plan B Workbooks. Currently we are working on a 'best of' of all workbooks - called "Essentials" - that will summarise the research done over the last 2 years of Beyond Plan B. We will keep you posted!

Workbook I  ‘Project-Analysis’ - summarizes our research into projects and strategies with a spatial impact which were initialized to improve the position and resilience of regions.

Workbook II ‘Core & Periphery’ contents a first reflection on the conditions of being a core or a periphery in europe. The workbook investigates the socio-economic position of the rhine-regions.

Workbook III 'Rhinecon' aims to explore how to strengthen the economic resilience of the Rhine region in relation to other parts of Europe and the world. In this way core periphery relationships between economics and spatial development are explored.

Workbook IV ‘Regions’ summarises our research into the challenges regions operating in our research area are facing and dealing with. 

Workbook V 'Project Conclusions' continues where workbook I ended. The research method as presented in the first beyond plan B workbook is further developed. 

You can download a (low resolution) PDF of each of the workbooks from this website, please contact us if you're interested in a higher resolution version.

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PROJECT: EEG

The goal of the Sustainable Energy Act is protecting the climate through the means of supporting the sustainable developement of longterm energysupplies by reducing CO2 output and preserving fossile fuels. 

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The goal of the Sustainable Energy Act is protecting the climate through the means of supporting the sustainable developement of longterm energysupplies by reducing CO2 output and preserving fossile fuels. The target number is to increase the share of renewable energy by 40-45% ,by 2025 and 55-60% by 2035.At the same time the promotion of technology and innovation and by this means secure global competitiveness and expand employment . 

Initial Situation

  • finite nature and instability of fossil fuel supply
  • risk of nuclear power (e.g. Fukushima) and complexity of problems with atomic waste storage
  • energy crisis and the German dependency on oil and gas imports from Russia or the middle east
  • the economic base in rural agricultural regions is under pressure. 
  • overproduction in agricultural products
Objectives
  • reducing CO2 output
  • increasing self-sufficiency
  • developing a leading position in renewable energy-related technologies
  • giving rural regions new economic perspective in not just feeding the urban population, but supplying them which energy as well.
Assets
  • unused land
  • clear and widespread public opinion for making the “Energiewende” an the will of spreading the cost over all citizens. 
  • already successful enterprises in energy-related technology
  • strong research in universities 
  • free market for electricity supply
  • no state controlled big energy suppliers to lose their position
  • suitable landscapes and climate conditions for different technologies, sun in the south and east, wind mainly in the north, biomass everywhere.
Strategy
  • as a part of a general strategy consisting of several laws and regulations from making cars more fuel efficient to shutting down nuclear power plants the EEG uses an approach which is not based on the idea of regulating but giving maximum priority in grid access to renewable energy.
  • fixed feed in tariffs are guaranteed for  fixed periods of several years. 
  • The height of the tariffs for the different types of energy generation were calculated in away making investment lucrative. 
  • The height of the tariff is falling constantly and is predictable, giving the industry a motivation to work constantly on cutting costs, making the technology and the productions more efficient.
  • Stimulating a massive initial demand which should start the mechanism “cost-cutting by scale”
  • the cost for introducing a technology which was not competitive in the beginning will be spread over more than ten years and paid by the costumers. 
Actions
  • first Law / regulations in 1991
  • 6 modifications to date adjusting the law to the technological development. 
  • continuously adjusting the feed in tariff
  • changing other regulations like building regulations in a way that the market-approach of the EEG could develop dynamically.
Effects
  • massive growth of the share of renewable energy in the electricity mix
  •  growing number of employees working in renewable energy industries. From 278.000 in 2008 up to estimated 400.000 in 2020.
  • new economic perspectives for appropriate rural regions and farmers as  compensation for shrinking subsidies for farmers
  • first: development of strong national and international players in the field of PV based on a lot of venture capital. Later, especially the firms producing PV-cells lost in competition with Asian semiconductor firms .
  • citizen run energy cooperatives are popping up

 

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PROJECT: Cargolifter

Cargolifter AG was an enterprise focusing on worldwide logistics, with the goal of developing an airship that would transport a weight of up to 160 tons point to point. 

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Cargolifter AG was an enterprise focusing on worldwide logistics, with the goal of developing an airship that would transport a weight of up to 160 tons point to point. On a abandoned military airport in East Germany the enterprise which was a private investment started to build a huge research and production facility with money raised in an IPO. The enterprise went bankrupt before the first airship ever took off.

Today, the CL CargoLifter GmbH & Co. KG company, founded by former Cargolifter AG shareholders, seeks to sell the lighter-than-air technology and is exploring the construction of smaller airships.

Initial Situation

  • Cargolifter AG was created on 1 September 1996 in Wiesbaden, Germany. 
  • A public stock offering took place in 2000
  • The shareholder structure was characterised by a high proportion of small investors, 
  • Substantial press coverage of new breakthrough technologies being promised.
Objectives
  • Offering a logistics service based on a point-to point transport of heavy and oversized loads.
  • Research, design, develop and produce airships and other lighter-than-air (LTA) technology 
  • Re-powering the oldest way of airborne transportation, the zeppelin
  • Establishing a lead position in the stratospheric airship market - a market that is set to grow significantly
  • Worldwide usage of CargoLifter airships for construction and other projects in remote areas would help minimise ecological damage by reducing the need to build extensive roads or temporary airfields.
Assets
  • An abandoned old Soviet military airbase in Brand-Briesen was used to build the production and operation center.
  • The facility was located approximately 60km. from Berlin
  • Expected cost of building one zeppelin was roughly half the cost of a Boeing 747. That is why CargoLifter has found its investors among many transport companies (such as Boeing) and industrial customers round the world.
  • Germany’s largest private company by number of shareholders; around 70,000. Of which 65% private individuals, 29% financial institutions and 6% industrial partners invested a total of 250 million euro

Strategy

  • To build up to 50 CL160-airships by 2015 and an additional 10 CL75’s
  • To establish a global infrastructure system that could support the worldwide fleet of airships
  • Once in service, the vehicles would trigger a paradigm shift in oversized and heavy logistical solutions 
  • Cargolifter was more than a manufacturer of vehicles, it developed a structure whithin which all components necessary to design, develop manufacture and operate LTA logistics vehicles were present. 
Actions
  • 1998: The construction of a large hangar for production and operation of the CL160 and engineering team facilities were built on the former Soviet Air Force base at Brand-Briesen Airfield.
  • A small scale experimental airship known as “Joey” was built and had its maiden flight in October 1999.
  • Another aircraft, the “CL 75 Aircrane” transportation balloon prototype, of similar size was built but destroyed in a storm in July 2002.
  • A test flight above Manaus was supposed to take place in 2002, as this article mentions. The German company probably met insolvency before it could be done.
  • On 7 June 2002 the company announced insolvency, and liquidation proceedings began the following month. The fate of parts of the 300 million euros in shareholder funds from over 70,000 investors is still unclear.

Effects

  • Due to technical issues within the logistic chain of the LTA technology (docking the airships in extreme situations), the development of the Cargolifter halted.
  • In June 2003, the company’s facilities were sold off for less than 20% of the construction costs. The airship hangar was converted to a ‘tropical paradise’-themed indoor holiday resort called Tropical Islands, which opened in 2004.
  • The Skyship airship, which had been purchased by Cargolifter for training and research purposes, was sold to Swiss Skycruise and used in Athens for flights connected with the Olympic games held there.


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PROJECT: Konzerthaus

The city of Dortmund built a high end concerthall relatively inexpensively in a weak neighbourhood called Brückstrass in order to make the region, the city and the neighbourhoud more attractive by establishing high class culture.

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The city of Dortmund built a high end concerthall relatively inexpensively in a weak neighbourhood called Brückstrass in order to make the region, the city and the neighbourhoud more attractive by establishing high class culture.

Initial Situation

  • Coal, steel and beer has guaranteed economic prosperity beyond the middle of the past century in the eastern Ruhr area.
  • In recent years, the former ‘Steel City’ has developed into a modern and cosmopolitan metropolis.
  • As a result of rival gangs, raids and high shop vacancy rates in the Brückstrasse, the city of Dortmund wanted to refresh the dilapidated neighbourhood.

 Objectives

  • An improvement in retail opportunities and a reduction in vacancy rates in the area.
  • Attract companies from gastronomy, nightlife and popular cultures.
  • Create a cultural program that will attract more than just the cultural elite. The hall’s artistic director, Benedict Stampa wanted to demonstrate that ‘the hall was built by the public for the public.’

 Assets

  • Financed mostly by the community.
  • At a cost of 49 million, the hall was built relatively inexpensively. The final cost was only 58 % higher than the first estimations.
  • In addition to many benefit concerts and fundraisers, local cultural foundations donated equipment and materials, including a 53 register concert organ.
Strategy
  • By establishing high class culture in the Ruhrgebiet, Wolfgang Clement, the prime minister of NRW, had at the beginning of the 90’s the idea to make Dortmund as a part of the Ruhrgebiet more attractive to higher educated inhabitants as a economic strategy.
  • The design of the ground floor , made entirely of glass, integrated the hall in the urban space. The large foyer of the house opens out to the intersection Brückstrasse/ Ludwigstrasse.
  • The play of colour on the glass facade comes into contact with passing pedestrians, conveying different moods depending on time of day, weather and concert program.
  • Within two seconds, the concert hall can achieve ideal reverberation time and with 40cm thick concrete walls, external disturbances are almost impossible.
Actions
  • On 1 February 1999, the old universe cinema was demolished to the ground.
  • On 16 October 2000, the first cornerstone was laid and in September 2002, The Konzerthaus Dortmund was opened.
  • The Konzerthaus was designed by Dortmund based architecture firm Schröder/ Schulte/ Ladbeck/ Strothmann.
  • Construction of the new facility generated considerable controversary as Germany was enduring a time of strained communal budgets.
Effect
  • The house is the new heart of the Brückstrasse, an urban artery with history. Brückstrasse is now an acute redevelopment area.
  • Due to its central location, the concert hall has become a powerful nucleus, giving resusitation to an entire district.
  • The concert hall has established itself as an important element in both Dortmund and Germany’s cultural scene with over 200 events per season.
  • After ten years, the concert hall was accepted as the youngest member of the european concert hall organization. (ECHO)
  • 2015 the Brückviertel is discribed as a living, creativ (mainly music based) neighbourhood, but has still a long way to go.

 


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INTERVIEW: "We Need New Narratives"

ARCHITECTURE WORKROOM BRUSSELS

Joachim Declerck is founder and partner of the Architecture Workroom Brussels; Educated as architect and urban designer; from 2008 to 2011 head of the professional development program at the Berlage Institute.

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Joachim Declerck is founder and partner of the Architecture Workroom Brussels; Educated as architect and urban designer; from 2008 to 2011 head of the professional development program at the Berlage Institute; Curator of the 3rd International Architecture Biennale Rotterdam, in 2007; Curator of the exhibition Building for Brussels. Architecture and Urban Transformation in Europa in BOZAR (2010). He was part of the Curator Team of the 5th International Architecture Biennale Rotterdam - Making City (April 2012).

 

For almost 10 years now you and your office ‘Architecture Workroom Brussels’ have been working on European topics. First it was Brussels as a Capital City of Europe, now you are working on regional questions in the Flemish Diamond and Brabant. Where do you see Europe in terms of spatial and political agenda? What do you see as the big issues that are being discussed, where space and politics come together?

Currently there is a huge fight between the logic of countries and the logic of urban regions. Europe has installed this fight by its urban- and INTERREG- programs and the regional developmentprogram is looking for specific needs and potentials of each region. 

That is a strong thing and builds experience between cities. Only it is very much oriented towards public-authorities and not towards civil society, professionals and experts. That is a weakness.
Another topic is the interpretation of the word region, especially in the neo-nationalist rhetoric. There are those that see the world as something organised around city- or urban logics and people that follow a more nationalist logic and neglecting that the world is rather spiky than flat. This is a major implicit debate, which is never verbally expressed but is always present in the committee of the regions and cities.
The situation between these two effects of globalisation is one of the major challenges for Europe. Everything is much more urban and everybody wants to retreat into something that is a whole, a world in itself. My country, my region, my neighbours, which are the same kind of people.

Is that simply a question of power shifting away from the nation states towards Brussels or do you see it actually hamper development because certain issues cannot be dealt with at that level? 

The question is whether the nation states should be considered the units to talk to, or whether they should move into a facilitating role, connecting the urban situations with a greater Europe. Nation states are interesting inventions, exactly in-between where it really happens and the higher levels on which collaboration needs to be organised. The network-city is a centuries old European buzzword, from the networks of monasteries to the Hanse cities. Talking about network cities is to return to the essence of where the continent has grown from. And this is very closely connected to economy. It’s the moment to get economy back into the field of our discussions. But not as a world in itself, that has its rules and principles that should be followed - which is a bit how politics looks at economy. It is an important shift in thinking that still has to be made in many countries, that you can steer and you can facilitate economy.

One hypothesis of our research concerns to the topic of ‘Core versus Periphery’. Would you agree that in recent years we have seen a shift in stimulus investments from the periphery to the core?

Well, a lot of money goes to the periphery but it’s not that it only goes to the periphery. If the one gets more in cohesion funding, the other one will get more in INTERREG or URBan 1, 2, 3, - 15, - 25. Europe functions like that. The weakness is that it’s a stabilising system. If it were a choice to invest in the periphery or if it were a choice to invest in the centre, that would be strong. Because it would make clear that there is thinking behind subsidies.

It is an interesting question how far can you steer economy or in how far politics is simply following the economy. Boris Gehlen described how far the private sector has taken over even urban development and raises the question how governments could be more steering, more than through tender procedures and narrow corridors that again make the world flat.

Governments can help to create climates in which things become rather feasible than not. Economy has a pretty simple logic: to make profit and to exploit. It’s also a constant conflict between agglomeration and moving away from agglomeration.

[...]

 

Interview conducted by Martin Sobota & Helmut Thoele 

Full version of the interview can be downloaded below (PDF)

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INTERVIEW: "It is about creating the breeding grounds for the future"

THE NETHERLANDS ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESMENT AGENCY (PBL)

Dr. Otto Raspe is senior economic researcher at the PBL in The Hague. His focus is on the (impact of the rise of the) knowledge economy, innovation and entrepreneurship.

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Otto Raspe studied Economics at Tilburg University. After his graduation he worked as a researcher / consultant at The Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), where he advised on the topics of (spatial) economic development, the impact of spatial investments (impact analysis, cost-benefit analysis), industry studies and (regional) economic benchmarks. Since mid 2002 he works as senior researcher at The Netherlands Environmental Assessment in The Hague. Here his focus is on the (impact of the rise of the) knowledge economy, innovation and entrepreneurship. Otto successfully defended his dissertation on The Regional Knowledge Economy on December 14th 2009 (Utrecht University). He often gives lectures and publishes on these topics.


What is your perception on the on-going discussion about the relevance of agglomeration policies linked to the attention for metropolitan areas and an economic renewal? How is the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) involved in the national and international discussion?

We just finished a report with the CPB, The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, about agglomeration economies and how we understand the mechanisms behind it. We talked about the international research that highlights the importance of agglomeration economies. Firms and people are clustering in cities, since they are 2-10% more productive in cities. This is due to three main mechanisms. It is about input sharing mechanisms, where suppliers can specialise further to make better products and therefore can sell their products better. Labour market pooling and matching mechanisms have a significant influence so the skills of employees are better matched with the demand of firms in cities. The final mechanism is knowledge spill overs. Cities are places where a lot of people meet and share ideas. Cities are the breeding ground of entrepreneurship and innovation. Gradually, agglomeration economies are becoming more important. Especially since our economy is transforming into a knowledge economie, that thrives thanks interactions by human capital. There are no general rules that cities always have the same benefits by equal size. Cities and agglomerations have different growth paths due to the economic structure of a city, the types of activities, the types of jobs they have and the transition in economies. Some cities do not profit much from agglomeration economies because they have a lot of firms at the end of their lifecycles with no gains in productivity or employment growth. On the contrary, some cities are doing very well in renewing their activities. For example, Eindhoven had a very different structure forty years ago. During a severe economic crisis related to the loss of the biggest employer, Phillips, the region reinvented itself as a Brainport. Amsterdam also reinvented itself on creative industries and life sciences and Rotterdam is really struggling to set the same growth figures. They are lacking behind and are below the average in job growth in The Netherlands. Amsterdam and Eindhoven are good examples and are far above the growth rate of average cities in Europe. It is difficult to say there are golden rules with the impact issues and mechanisms. You cannot say that when you stimulate ‘x’ in every city, you always have certain growth, and there is a big difference in employment growth and productivity growth. Productivity is added value divided by employment, and cities that renew, create a lot of jobs, like Amsterdam. The productivity figures are not growing as much as the employment growth does because otherwise they have to gain a lot of added value, more than job growth. Most new activities have lower productivity rates because creative industries are not as productive as an established knowledge intensive chemical firm, for example, which evolved over fifty years. There is a negative slope between forty years of employment growth in Europe and productivity growth and that is forming a significant theme I’m currently working on.

Do you recognise a growing demand from policy makers and politicians about this topic in relation to the question of the distribution of power between cities, urban agglomerations and nation states in Europe and worldwide?

I have been lecturing on the topic of agglomeration economies for more than fifteen years now. Terms such as agglomeration economies or agglomeration power, were inner circle terms used by academics only in international journals, but now the average policy maker uses these terms as often as a scientist. Policy makers are especially aware of the importance in relation to the competitiveness of their cities and regions. Certain books contribute to that success like The Triumph of the City by Edward Glaeser, which summarises why cities work economically so good and why cities are imported for economies. The book ‘If mayors ruled the world’ by Benjamin Barber described how cities will be more important than nation states. However, not every city is a winner and not every city has a mayor with the capacity to rule the world. In the Netherlands, we have a lot of mayors who are struggling on how to formulate economic strategies. Eindhoven has a very capable mayor but in the Dutch context he has to make certain strategies with the 23 neighbouring municipalities in de region, for example concerning amenities. He also has coalitions between cities within a 30 minute radius and with necessary links towards the national and international urban networks, on the larger scale. 

How do we make and organise good cities and agglomerations which are part of a multi-level network?

So, at least 5 scales are important. Mayors have to constantly level on different scales and there are a lot of policy related questions regarding the most relevant scale for a certain economic development topicand what can we do on different strategic scales. The real question is how we organise a spatial economic system which is not unified by one spatial scale but all the scales we discussed earlier, which are very dynamic. How do we make and organise good cities and agglomerations which are part of a multi-level network?

This question links to our role as urbanists and designers and one of the reasons to start Beyond Plan B. How do you see architects and urban planners acting in this topic? Dutch firms, for example, are internationally very known and successful with designing buildings, cities and regional plans but they not very present in the spatial-economic discussion in Europe and in the Netherlands. 

One of my observations is that many architects are looking solely at the object they are making. They are making a new building or public space, which is not related to the five spatial scales already mentioned. In a city structure, there are administrative boundaries, neighbouring city relations, the link to national economic centres and on a broader scale with international connectivity. Spatial disciplines are acting too separate from economic dynamics. In the logics of the spatial disciplines, it does not seem to matter whether you build a building in Leeuwarden or in Amsterdam. Leeuwarden is not an international competitive region in need of a world trade centre. Too often the same success formula is applied to every region designers are working in. It is about embedding the objects into the economy of the city it is performing in.

[...]

 

Interview conducted by Helmut Thoele 

Full version of the interview can be downloaded below (PDF)

 

 

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LECTURE: Ronald Wall

RHINECON

FIlm: Lecture by dr. Ronald Wall on workbook III, Rhinecon

May 2nd 2015

 

A pdf of the presentation can also be downloaded at the workbook section

 

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INTERVIEW ‘‘Der Strukturwandel bleibt die Aufgabe’’

METROPOLERUHR

Michael Schwarze-Rodrian arbeitet seit Mitte der 80er Jahre im Ruhrgebiet.

Dr. Claas Beckord war von 2007 bis 2014 beim Regionalverband Ruhr im Referat Regionalentwicklung beschäftigt.

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METROPOLERUHR

Michael Schwarze-Rodrian hat Landschaftsplanung studiert, leitet seit 2012 das Referat Europäische und regionale Netzwerke Ruhr und nimmt die Aufgaben des EU Beauftragten des Regionalverbands Ruhr (RVR) wahr. Er arbeitet seit Mitte der 80er Jahre im Ruhrgebiet. Im Mittelpunkt seiner Tätigkeiten stehen Strategien und Projekte der nachhaltigen Stadt-, Standort- und Landschaftsentwicklung. Im polizentrischen Ballungsraum Ruhrgebiet ist dies immer verbunden mit der Kooperation und Moderation kommunaler und regionaler Partner.

Claas Beckord hat an der WWU Münster Geographie studiert und an der TU Chemnitz promoviert. Von 2007 bis 2014 war er beim Regionalverband Ruhr im Referat Regionalentwicklung beschäftigt und leitete dort ab 2010 das Team Masterplanung. Im Mittelpunkt seiner Tätigkeit standen neben regionalanalytischen Fragestellungen vor allem die Konzeption, strategische Weiterentwicklung und Umsetzung des Regionalen Diskurses. Heute leitet er bei der Stadt Osnabrück das Team Strategische Stadtentwicklung und Statistik.


Wofür steht die MetropoleRuhr?  

Die Metropole Ruhr steht für einen hochkomplexen und differenzierten Ballungsraum. Der Versuch einer Beschreibung mit wenigen Merkmalen muss darum scheitern. Ein Ballungsraum ist per Definition kein Monoweg eines Einzelnen, einer Gruppe oder eines Wirtschaftszweiges.  Früher meinte man uns mit zwei Merkmalen als industriellen und dicht besiedelten Agglomerationsraum - beschreiben zu können – was auch schon nicht stimmte. Wir waren und sind ein sehr viel differenzierteres Gebilde. Dabei zeichnet uns eine starke Kohäsion - also das Leben mit großen Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschieden - aus.

Was sind im Moment die wichtigen laufenden Projekte und Prozesse in der Region?

Inhaltlich gilt es den Strukturwandel fortzuführen und zu gestalten. Dabei sind die Defizite, die sich räumlich der ökonomischen Transformation von Süden nach Norden folgend verlagert haben, die zentrale Herausforderung. Ökonomisch ist der Strukturwandel bereits weit vorangeschritten, hingegen ist er sozial, städtebaulich und kulturell an vielen Stellen noch sehr präsent. Das heißt im Strukturwandel haben wir es immer mit drei Zuständen eines hochkomplexen Systems mit 5 Mio. Einwohnern und 53 Städten zu tun: mit der Vergangenheit, mit den verschiedene Zwischenzuständen und mit ebenso vielen Zukünften.

Als formaler Prozess steht der neue Regionalplan auf der Agenda, der bis 2017 erstmalig in dieser Form entstehen soll. Dieser wird von einem umfangreichen Diskussionsprozess um die Zukunft der Metropole Ruhr begleitet, der unter dem Titel „Regionaler Diskurs“ vielfältige informelle Formate wie z.B. den Ideenwettbewerb Zukunft Metropole Ruhr“ bündelt.

Als weitere informelle und freiwillige aber sehr gut organisierte und regelmäßige Zusammenarbeit sind zum einen das „Konzept Ruhr“, in dem Stadtentwicklung und Standortentwicklung zusammengedacht werden, und an dem 41 Städte gemeinsam arbeiten, und zum anderen Programm „Wandel als Chance“, das als gemeinsames Projekt von 17 Städten eine nachhaltige Gestaltung des Endes des Steinkohlenbergbaus bis 2018 lokal vor Ort organisiert zu nennen.

Gibt es über den Strukturwandel hinaus (neue) große mittel- oder langfristige Themen? 

Die Themen der Gegenwart sind sicher auch die Themen der Zukunft. Es gibt nach wie vor eine hohe soziale Dringlichkeit bezogen auf Stadtteile mit besonderem Erneuerungsbedarf (Armut, Bildungsrückstand, Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit) in denen, das was wir die soziale Durchlässigkeit nennen, gefährdet oder nicht gegeben ist. 

Als große räumliche Aufgabe ist der Emscher Landschaftspark, an dem seit 25 Jahren gearbeitet wird, noch nicht abgeschlossen. Die Qualifizierung der Stadtlandschaft mit dem Parallelprojekt des Umbaus der Emscher als Wassersystem für insgesamt 4.3 Mrd. € kann man zwar an vielen Nebenläufen bereits erleben, am Hauptlauf wird es jedoch noch bis 2027 dauern, ehe der Fluss wieder vollumfänglich als landschaftliches Element im Stadtraum genutzt werden kann.

Zum Strukturwandel gehören aber genauso die wirtschaftliche Diversifizierung und die kulturellen Schwerpunkte; dazu gehören die Universitäten, die in den 60er Jahren entstanden sind und die sich nun in der Universitätsallianz einem weltweiten Wissenschaftswettbewerb stellen.

Nicht zu vergessen Themen wie Verkehr und Energie, wobei sich bei der Energie langsam andeutet, dass hier noch größere Umwälzungen bevorstehen. In unserer Region sind die Betriebssitze der Atom- und Kohlekonzerne, deren Wirtschaftsmodell, sei es durch gesellschaftliche Veränderungen oder das Haltbarkeitsdatum der fossilen Energiegewinnung zur Zeit unter Druck steht. Wenn diese Firmen in Schieflage geraten, dann trifft dies die Region doppelt. Zum einen klassisch auf der Versorgungsebene, aber insbesondere auch finanziell, da viele Kommunen historisch bedingt große Aktienpakete der entsprechenden Versorger besitzen; unmittelbar fallen die Gewinne und Dividenden weg und mittelbar damit auch das Gewerbe- und letztlich auch das Einkommensteueraufkommen.

Zuwanderung und Integration war und bleibt ein Thema. Die polyethnische Herkunft der Menschen war in der Vergangenheit ein Thema und sie ist es auch heute. Eine Stärke des Ruhrgebiets ist seine erarbeitete und erlernte Integrationskraft. Unsere Region hat sowohl ethnisch als auch bezüglich unterschiedlichster Konfessionen eine gewaltige Integrationsleistung erbracht. Eine Fähigkeit, die zum Beispiel bei der Zusammenführung evangelischer und katholischer Zechen in der RAG entwickelt wurde.

Es gibt also viele große Prozesse, die gleichzeitig stattfinden und um dies noch mal aus Ingenieurssicht zu verdeutlichen: Die Transformation der Emscher ist noch lange nicht abgeschlossen, wir sind bei ca. 60% des Umbaus. Bis wieder ausschließlich Regenwasser in einem natürlichen Flussbett fließt und die Ufer zugänglich sind, wird es noch mehr als ein Jahrzehnt dauern. Damit ist klar, dass im Moment keine Notwendigkeit aber auch keine Möglichkeit gibt, große oder gar neue Megaprojekte anzuschieben oder zu entwickeln.

Welche Rolle und Funktion hat bei diesen Prozessen die MetropoleRuhr als regionaler Akteur und Regisseur? Wie würden Sie die Konstitution der MetropoleRuhr beschreiben.

Die MetropoleRuhr hat als Dachorganisation zum Ziel neue wirtschaftliche Aktivität in neuem räumlichen Kontext zu stimulieren und zu organisieren. Dabei geht es uns um eine internationale Neupositionierung als Metropole. Gleichzeitig gehen wir damit aber auch den Weg des Strukturwandels seit der IBA konsequent weiter und profitieren von unserer lange Erfahrung auf allen Ebenen. Wir haben ein gutes Netzwerk auf politischer und administrativer Ebene. 

In einem Gebiet mit großen lokalen Unterschieden in der Entwicklungsdynamik spielen wir unsere starken Punkte konsistent aus: Offene und gut gesteuerte Prozesse, Vertrauen, Freiwilligkeit, Kooperation, Gute Datengrundlagen, starke Identität und Integrationsleistung. Wir sind eine stabile Einheit mit starker Organisation und guten Instrumenten.

Der Regionalverband als wichtiger Träger der Regionalentwicklung ist von seiner Gremienstruktur sehr breit aufgestellt, mit der Politik, Arbeitgeber- und Arbeitnehmervertretern als Mitgliedern.

Die gemeinsame Wirtschaftsförderung MetropoleRuhr ist eine 100 %  Tochter des RVR. Sie operiert national und international auf den Leitmärkten, um die sich das Ruhrgebiet „kümmern“ muss. Hier agieren die Kommunen gemeinsam nach außen, hingegen ist das operative Geschäft des Pflegens eines Wirtschaftsstandortes nach wie vor lokal organisiert, dies sehen wir als Stärke, weil nur lokal die nötige Kenntnis über die individuelle Situation der Betriebe vorhanden ist.

Parallele operationelle Strukturen gibt es auch beim Tourismus, hier tritt national und international das Ruhrgebiet zusammen auf, die Ruhr Tourismus GmbH organisiert diese gemeinsame Außendarstellung bereits seit 8 Jahren sehr erfolgreich. Auch die Kultur Ruhr GmbH die z. B. die Ruhrtrienale organisiert, ist im Prinzip so konzipiert: Nach Außen gemeinsam agieren und im Inneren Zusammenspiel der Städte der gesellschaftlichen Kräfte das Freiwilligkeitsprinzip pflegen.

[...]

 

Interview conducted by Helmut Thoele and Matthias Rottmann
26th of March / 10th of April 2014 Essen

 

Full version of the interview can be downloaded below (PDF)



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PROJECT: Emscherpark

Once one of the most polluted and environmentally devastated regions of the world,  is revitalized and turned into a park for culture, recreation and urban development.

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Situation

  • As a result of large-scale industrialization, the coal and steel industries along the Ruhrgebiet was the economical backbone of every city for decades. 
  • Due to the vast increases in the service economy and the global shift in production areas, the Ruhr-area faced big 
  • challenges to cope with these developments.
  • The monostructural economy and the lack of innovative activities for the labour force caused a high urgency for a spatial- economic transition of the area.
  • Industrial closures led to empty, unused brownfields, causing  huge fragmentation between certain parts of towns and the natural landscape.  
  • Decades of heavy industrial production and mining had caused severe ecological and geological problems in Emsher Park. 
  • The river Emscher was polluted when the mining companies used it as a dumping ground for sewerage. It then became a symbolic icon of the challenge to transform the area. 

 

Strategy

  • Setting up an informal process based on a strong spatial idea and combining hundreds of projects into one new context.
  • All public community projects were established in co-operation with private investors, citizens, companies and initiative groups.
  • A ‘pool’ of brownfields was used to generate projects on common property. 
  • Strategic ‘flagship’ projects and icons were appointed for the transformation.
  • The terms ‘industrial heritage’ and ‘industrial culture’ was introduced to create a new identity referencing to roots in the past, using art and entertainment programs.
  • The park was structured into sub-units with different steering units.
  • Cheap dwelling units were developed and promoted in existing or new buildings.

 

Objectives

  • Stabilize and foster the area by starting a transition process which creates opportunities and future perspectives for the people and companies in the area.
  • Develop an industrial region with a new spatial economic identity.
  • Attract new economic activities, companies and investments.
  • Stop and reverse the demographic development.
  • Create an ecological and socio-economical process of renewal for the Emscher region and the northern part of the river Ruhr.
  • Protect and conserve the old Industrial monuments as a landmark. 
 
Assets
  • There was a very high common sense of urgency by the various parties involved.
  • 457 sq. km of landscape in Emscher Park. 
  • A network of brownfields.
  • 20 municipalities inspired and inspiring people at the right moment such as Christoph Zopel and Karl Ganser.
  • Highly developed infrastructure and good connections to leading business cities in North Rhine-Westphalia.
  • Very cheap dwelling units compared to the other regions in the state. 
  • The heritage of a unique industrial infrastructure, embedded in the landscape of three river valleys.
 
Actions
  • Inspired by the IBA Berlin, Dr. Christoph Zopel, minister of Urban Development in the NRW, pushed the announcement of an IBA Emscher in 1988. The IBA and Masterplan created a network for 20 industrial municipalities along the Emscher Region, to support each other and using the concept to apply for EU- structural funds.
  • In December 1988, The IBA Emscher Park GmbH was founded.
  • The area was divided into several units; one east-west corridor and seven north-south corridors with their own priorities and committees. 
  • This was to achieve high quality projects and design competitions, these were held to attract investors for the future.
  • In 1996, the IBA was the German architectural contribution at the Venice Biennale.
  • The long-term unemployed were hired for casual work and to retrain their skills and mindset. 


Effect

  • The IBA and Masterplan are now internationally known references in the study of the transformation of a region.
  • During the 10 years of the IBA ,there was 120 projects developed. 25 of these projects created new living areas with 2500 dwelling units. 5000 dwelling units were designed and constructed in the existing buildings of the old mine.
  • The city of Essen was appointed as the European Capital of Culture in 2010 .
  • ‘Zeche Zollverein,’ an old coal mine in Essen, became a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
  • In spatial and cultural terms, the identity and quality of the area has improved enormously.
  • The socio-economic development of the area still remains a critical challenge.


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PROJECT: Phoenix see

The Phoenix See is located at the former blast furnace and steel plant site Hoesch, respectively Thyssenkrup.

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Situation

  • Dortmund, as well as many other cities in the Ruhr area was  particularly affected by the slow decline of the coal and steel industries.
  • In 1997, the last existing steel company in the Ruhr area, the Thyssen, decided to abandon their plant in Dortmund - Hörde after joining up with Krupp as ThyssenKrupp.
  • In January 2001, the ‘Hörde Torch’ was demolished.  This marks the end of one of the largest dismantling in the industrial history.
  • The former capital of industry was confronted with a high number of unemployment and brownfields scattered all over the city, separating living quarters and public space.
  • In June 2000, the Dortmund Project was implemented.


Objectives

  • Transform from an industrial and manufacturing location to an international science and technology location.
  • Use the collapse of the economic structures as an opportunity to completely redesign the city.
  • Increase the quality of life substantially in the city making it attractive for potential companies and investors.
  • To increase the quality of life substantially in the city, make itself attractive for companies and investors. So the city can attract employees that are productive and economically qualified.
  • Attract new stable populations.
 

Assets

  • An abandoned old industrial site in the Southern urban area in the district Hörde in Dortmund.
  • The western part of the Phoenix area is being developed as a priority location for Micro- Nanotechnology, Production Technology, Information Technology and Business Services.
  • On the abandoned industrial sites in the Ruhr area arises ‘spontaneous nature’, so called Industrial nature.


Strategy

  • McKinsey Development Strategy: The city of Dortmund should focus its strength for the next ten years on the bundled settlement of the growth industries of information industry, telecommunication technologies, Nano-technology, microsystems technology and logistics. 
  • After the demolition and removal of industrial parts and underground foundations along with the decontamination of the terrain, flooding started in 2010 with a big festival with the participation of 55000 people to celebrate the turning away of Dortmund’s industrial past.
  • Create two new living areas at the South and North shore of the Phoenix See with in total app. 1000 residential units focussing on attracting and keeping middle- and upper class citizen within the city boundaries.
  • Using an attractive landscape as an asset attracting business and people. 


Actions

  • In 2001, the Phoenix See Development Corporation was established.
  • To promote the architecture of the residential development and to attract buyers and builders, the city of Dortmund held an exhibition ‘Building at the Phoenix See’ where 52 designs were presented.
  • In December 2009, the Emscher returned to the surface and reconnected Phoenix East and West. 
  • With several initiatives and investments the city of Dortmund tries to upgrade the urban area of the district Hörde (improvement Clarenberg, improvement infrastructure and alteration of the station).


EFFECT

  • The district Hörde plays an essential part in relation between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ Dortmund. The district Hörde remains a difficult social and urban situation. 
  • The urbanization added a new dimension. The planning brought the privileged and the disadvantaged together and this created the situation in which the population of Dortmund socio-economically and socio - culturally   are increasingly growing apart. Polarization and segregation tendencies are becoming bigger.


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PROJECT: CentrO Oberhausen

The CentrO Oberhausen is major mixed use development on a former steel mill site in the heart of the Ruhr valley. Oberhausen is regarded as a prime example of the successful economic restructuring of a region. 

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Situation

  • The growth of Oberhausen, an independent municipality in Northrhine-Westphalia, was inextricably linked to its industrial past. The most defining spatial features of the city was largely determined by the needs of the manufacturers.
  • As factories closed, unsightly and polluted spots appeared on the map with no apparent value. Declining retail sales in both relative and real terms placed tremendous pressure on the sector to renew itself.
  • 39,000 manufacuring jobs were lost between 1961- 1987. Unemployment rates were at 17%.
  • City officials began to think proactively about economic development as the city was plagued with mounting debt, increasing from 181 million euro in 1980 to 233 million euro a decade later.
 

Objectives

  • Create 10,000 low-skilled jobs.
  • Spatially integrate the CentrO with existing townships.
  • Overcome the existing spatial barrier of the former steel plant in the city.
  • Enable the reuse of industrial land and improve Oberhausen’s industrial image.
 
Assets
  • In 1992, the 98 ha site was bought by the City of Oberhausen for about 10 million euro without prior decontamination.
  • The gasometer, a landmark of a former gas holder that is the highest in Europe (117.5m) is located near to the CentrO.
  • Central location in Europe’s largest conurbation. 60 million people live within a radius of 250km from CentrO.
  • 4 million people can reach CentrO within 30 minutes. 
  • 12 million people can reach CentrO witin 60 minutes. 
  • 30 million people can reach centrO within 2 hours.
 
Strategy
  • Attract 30 million annual visitors with a purchasing power of 150 million euro per year. 
  • Compensate for the predominantly car-oriented design of the centre by linking it to the public transport system of the city.
  • The nearest motorway exit and access to it was upgraded for 22 million euro. The centre is strategically located near three important motorways. Within a radius of 2.5km, there are twelve motorway exits leading out of the CentrO.
  • The combination of shopping, entertainment and tourism was used to help the relative decline of retail sales by offering other attractions and foster a synergy of functions.
  • 14,000 free car parking spaces.
  • To avoid any delays, one seat at local government was dedicated to address affairs regarding CentrO with external parties. 
  • A better spatial integration of the CentrO may have been possible if residential development would have been encouraged along the new public transport line.
 
Actions
  • The shopping centre was completed in a period of only two years with investments totalling 460 million euros. The grand opening took place on 12 September 1996.
  • The former minister President of Northrhine-Westphalia, Peer Steinbrück, opened the Marina on 21 August 2004, offering 70 moorings and 250km of navigable waterways.
  • The Giant Legoland Discovery Centre, the only one in west Germany, opened on 14 March 2013 and occupies a site of approx 2500m2.
 
Effect
  • The motivation behind the CentrO was primarily economic as the large scale development did not connect to the traditional settlement structure. 
  • The new jobs in CentrO offered lower wages and were often part-time, resulting in a 10% drop in the average wage levels for the city.
  • As only 15% of the new jobs went to people over 45, CentrO did not significantly help those who lost their industrial jobs. 
  • The centrO has proved to be a dangerous competition to retail and services in Oberhausen with a loss in shop value of 30%.
  • Loss of customers to the CentrO were even observed in the neighbouring cities of Essen, Mülheim and Bottrop.
 


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PROJECT: Eurotunnel

The Eurotunnel is one of the world's greatest civil engineering projects, connects the region Folkestone, Kent with Pas-de-Calais in France under the English Channel. 

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The Eurotunnel, widely recognised as one of the world’s greatest civil engineering projects, connects Britain with France under the English Channel. It is situated 75m under the Dover Channel and at 50,5 km long, it connects both countries within a travel time of 35 minutes. It consists of three tunnels;  two are used for transport and  the smaller one is used as a service and rescue tunnel. 

Situation

  • The idea for a cross-channel tunnel first arose more than 200 years ago but did not materialise due to national security and cost considerations.
  • 1803: The first known drawing of a channeltunnel by an English man, Henri Mottray.
  • 1851: A French man, Hector Moreau, introduced the first idea of an iron undersea tunnel which caught the attention of Napoleon III. Later he added a railwaysystem to the tunnel idea which was to be buried 75m under the seabed.
  • The channel was an ideal natural protector between the two countries during in WWI and WWII.
  • With the decision of building this permanent connection undersea, construction work and financial viability would be pushed to the limits for both countries. 
Objectives
  • England and France wanted to overcome the economical barrier that had been created through high shipping costs and remove the physical barrier between England and France and in particular, Europe. 
  • Enhance the travel time and improve the two economies through growing tourism and the transportation of goods.
  • Create a reliable connection which is not dependent on weather conditions.
  • Use the tunnel to improve the telephone network in the United Kingdom.
  • Create an alternative competitive link which is providing both speed and reliability to freight deliveries.
Assets
  • The short distance between Calais (FR.) and Dover(EN) made the project realistic.
  • The thick and stabile lime layers in the ground named marly chalk and limestone, was found to be the best tunneling material. It is impermeable due to its high clay content and provide short term stability.
  • The access to leading technology in tunnel construction helped to finish the project.

 Strategy

  • The French and English government insulated themselves from any financial risk and involvement by the way of tender to a third party. 
  • This build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) project gives the third party, Eurotunnel, the award of a 55 years operating concession to repay the banks and shareholders which can extend first to 65 and later to 99 years.
  • The Goverments were represented by the Inter-Governmental Commission (IGC)which made the final engineering and safety decisions.
  • Tunnel Boring Machines (TBM) were specifically designed for work at the Eurotunnel, drilling through the marly chalk.
  • Tolls were enforced on the tunnel to repay the loans of the project

Actions

  • 1985: Both countries agreed to restart the projects and a tender for a tunnel project.
  • 20 January 1986: The design for the tunnel was created.
  • 28 September 1988: Construction work begins.
  • 1 June 1994: The first train travelled through the tunnel.
  • 18 November 1996: A fire accident in the tunnel created negative headlines worldwide.
Effects
  • The project costs were twice as much as originally envisaged due to overruns and a fire accident. People’s behaviour to travel by ship and plane had also not changed as much as expected.
  • Initially, there was not enough money to build a high speed railway from London to Flokstone so timesaving for users was less than expected.
  • The Eurotunnel became the world’s greatest civil engineering project. 
  • The tunnel has had a huge impact on the travelling time between the two countries, decreasing considerably to 35 minutes by train.


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DOWNLOAD: Workbook III

Available for download now, Workbook III: Rhinecon. This study aims to explore how to strengthen the economic resilience of the Rhine region in relation to other parts of Europe and the world.

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Available for download now, Workbook III: Rhinecon. 


A research conducted by Ronald Wall, with an introduction by Frank van Oort.

As with the previous workbooks this study aims to explore how to strengthen the economic resilience of the Rhine region in relation to other parts of Europe and the world. In this way core periphery relationships between economics and spatial development are explored.

The workbook consists of two parts. The first part will focus on a descriptive research on Foreign direct investment (FDI). The second part of the workbook will focus on a more explanatory analysis on the spatial indicators of this research.

Where the first part of the workbook descriptively explores the inward and outward structure of FDI into Rhine Core and its sub-cores, the proposition of the second part is that FDI does not randomly locate in regions and cities, but is attracted by specific determinants.

You can download a (low resolution) PDF of Workbook III, please contact us if you're interested in a higher resolution version.

Also added is a PDF of the presentation held by Ronald Wall on may 2nd 2015

 



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INTERVIEW: ''Bedarfe wahrnehmen und Projekte realisieren''

REGION KOLN/BONN

Dr. Reimar Molitor ist Geschäftsführender Vorstand des Region Koln/Bonn e.V. 

Markus Utzerath (†2016) war Handlungsbevollmächtigter des Region Koln/Bonn e.V. 

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Dr. Reimar Molitor ist Geschäftsführender Vorstand des Region Köln/Bonn e.V.
Studiert hat er an der Westfälischen Wilhelm-Universität Münster, an der er seinen Abschluss als Diplomgeograph absolvierte. In der darauffolgenden Promotion wurde das Thema „nachhaltige Regionalentwicklung in Europa“ der Auftakt für diverse berufliche Stationen im Regionalmanagement und der Beratung von europäischen Regionen. Von 2000 bis 2003 bildete das Regionalmanagement der Regionale 2006 im Bergischen Städtedreieck den Einstieg in die Regionalentwicklung in Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Von 2004 bis 2012 betreute er geschäftsführend das Strukturprogramm Regionale 2010 in der Region Köln/Bonn.

Markus Utzerath ist leider 2016 vestorben. Er war Handlungsbevollmächtigter des Region Koln/Bonn e.V.
An der Universität Bonn hat der Geographie studiert. Nach zweijähriger freiberuflicher Tätigkeit als Stadtplaner war er von 1992-1999 zunächst Projektleiter bei der Wirtschaftsförderung Rhein-Erft GmbH und später Referent des Landrates Wirtschaft und Region des Erftkreises.
Seit 1999 arbeitete er an verschiedenen Stellen für die Region Köln/Bonn, bis 2004 im Regionalsekretariat und dann bis 2012 als Vertreter der Geschäftsführung der Regionale 2010 Agentur.

 

- Herr Molitor, Herr Utzerath, was ist Ziel und Zweck des Region Köln-Bonn e.V.?


Region KB: Ziel ist die regionale Kooperation innerhalb der Region Köln-Bonn. Der Verein ist mittlerweile im 23. Jahr seines Bestehens. Er hat 16 Mitarbeiter und einen Etat von durchschnittlich 1,5 Millionen Euro. Wir arbeiten sehr stark managementorientiert, kommunikationsorientiert, motivierend in Bezug auf Kooperation und dahinterliegend auch auf die Fragen nach realen Projekten. 16 Mitarbeiter, die hier in verschiedenen Disziplinen arbeiten, verstehen sich als Motivatoren und Koordinatoren für regionale Zukunft. Unsere Mitglieder sind die kreisfreien Städte und die Kreise, die Industrie- und Handelskammern Köln und Bonn/Rhein-Sieg, die Handwerkskammer zu Köln, der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, der Landschaftsverband Rheinland, die Sparkassen der Wirtschaftsregion Köln/Bonn und –a ls Gast - die Bezirksregierung Köln.
Horizontal wie vertikal sind dies keine passiven Mitglieder sondern in jeder Hinsicht aktiv. Wir koordinieren die Kooperation zwischen unseren Mitgliedern, wobei den 58kreisangehörigen Kommunen eine Sonderrolle zukommt. Obwohl formal nur die Kreise Mitglied sein können, nutzen diese den Verein als Berater, Sprungbrett und Mittler.
Wir finanzieren uns durch Mitgliedsbeiträge, haben eine Mitgliederversammlung und legen einen jährlichen Tätigkeitsbericht vor. Im Vergleich zu den anderen, stark formalisierten regionalen Einheiten an Rhein und Ruhr sind wir managementorientiert. Unser Institutionalisierungsgrad ist bewusst niedrig gehalten. Wir schieben viele Projekte und werden jährlich an konkreten Ergebnissen für unsere Mitglieder gemessen. Wir sind an dieser Stelle nicht nur bedarfsorientierter „Aufnehmer“ von Themen, Veredler, Realisierer und /oder Mithelfer, sondern in hohem Masse auch Initiator, Motivator und Scout.


- Was waren die wichtigsten Projekte der letzten 10 Jahre und welche Themen stehen aktuell auf der Agenda?


Region KB: Für eine Regionalentwicklung sind alle Projekte wichtig. Gerade auf unserem Maßstab kann es sein, dass die Summe vieler kleiner Projekte eine große Transformation mit sich bringt. Das zeigt sich z.B. beim Thema Innenentwicklung - eines unserer Kernthemen für die Zukunft. Wir versuchen mit dem Recycling von innenstadtrelevanten Arealen, egal, ob es eine Baulücke oder eine 100 Hektar große Betriebsfläche ist, einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Region zu leisten. Dabei geht es erst mal um Wahrnehmungsmanagement. Das ist auch eine Parallele zu Ihrem Maßstab des gesamten Flusslaufes. Mit Beyond Plan B erzeugen Sie ein bestimmtes Bild, was dann in einem iterativen Prozess erprobt wird. Dadurch erhält man verschiedene Perspektiven, die sich wieder in einem neuen Bild verdichten – und auf einmal ist das Bild eine Art Realität und handlungsleitend.
Es gibt ja kein festes Bild von Regionalentwicklung. Was wir machen ist in einem hohen Masse eine Wahrnehmungsmanagementkurve: Welche Bedarfe hat die Region?, Wie argumentieren sie diese Bedarfe?, Und wie wird daraus reales Projektvolumen vor Ort? Ein Beispiel: Die frühen Strategien der Regionale 2010 wurden auch so entwickelt. Zunächst wurden Bilder und eigene Befunde angeboten und getestet. Im zweiten Schritt folgten Bedarfs- und Chancen- sowie Defizitanalysen. Der Weg führte weiter über die Definition konkreter Projekte bis zur Realisierung in klaren Konsortien.
Dieser Prozess wird letztlich bei jedem übergeordneten Projekt erneut durchlaufen. Daraus wird dann wieder eine Lernkurve: motivierend, imitierend, adaptierend. Das vollzieht sich in Zyklen – und nach dem Spiel ist vor dem Spiel.


- Die Regionale 2010 als Instrument war erfolgreich. Ist sie auch die Methode für die Zukunft?


Region KB: Wenn man Regionale 2010 dechiffriert, ist sie - genauso wie die Idee der Kulturhauptstädte oder die RheinCharta – ein Instrument zur anlassbezogenen Entwicklung in einem ständigen Transformationsprozess.


ein Instrument zur anlassbezogenen Entwicklung in einem ständigen Transformationsprozess.


Aus der Managementperspektive heraus fragen wir: Läuft der Prozess oder wird er gestaltet? Ist er passiv oder aktiv? Unsere Aufgabe ist es, anlassbezogene Entwicklungen für die Region zu promovieren. Diese Aufgabe gehen wir inhaltlich entlang verschiedener Themenlinien an und versuchen Projektvolumen für die Regionalentwicklung zu erzeugen. Das war bei der Regionale so, war vor der Regionale so und ist jetzt auch so.

 

- Gab es andere externe Anlässe, wie z.B. die aktuelle Wirtschaftskrise oder den neuen Gotthardtunnel ?


Region KB: Ja, es gibt natürlich auch externe Impulse. Der Gesamtzustand unserer Infrastruktur kommt sicher auf die Tagesordnung und natürlich ist der Gotthardtunnel von Bedeutung für unsere Nord-Süd -Infrastruktur und die Funktionsfähigkeit des Transits. Diese Themen haben Implikation weit in die Binnenorganisation der Region hinein. Es besteht auch die Frage, wie eigentlich ein Organisationsmuster dieser Region in 20 Jahren aussieht. Natürlich wären wir gerne zielsicherer in der Frage, welche heutigen Entscheidungen morgen neue Anlässe und Effekte generieren. Niemand kann in die Zukunft schauen. Es ist momentan vielleicht auch eine Zeit, die man nicht so richtig lesen kann. Die Geschwindigkeit des technologischen Fortschritts, die Energiepreise und ihr Bezug zur Mobilität zeigen an einem Megatrend, dass alles zusammen zu hängen scheint. Anstatt sich bei Entscheidungen von solchen Megatrends abhängig zu machen, ist es vielleicht besser zu überlegen, was man selber gut kann und dann selbstbewusst als Region zu sagen: „Wir machen das jetzt so, wie wir das für richtig halten. Den Rest kann ich nicht beeinflussen.“


- Wie sind die Zusammenarbeit und das Management vor dem Hintergrund sich überlagernder Grenzen von Verbänden, Vereinen und Administrationen geregelt?


Region KB: Sie sind nicht geregelt sondern werden gemanagt. Management bedeutet das Organisieren von Dynamik. Jede Form von Dynamik, die wir hier im Augenblick haben, ist schwierig zu korrelieren mit Regeln. Unsere Mitglieder agieren teilweise horizontal und teils vertikal, von ihnen haben wir die Rolle des Dynamikmanagements erhalten – dies ist unser Alleinstellungsmerkmal. Die vertikalen Administrationen sind im Staatsgefüge vor allem dafür zuständig, zu verwalten (und wenn nötig mit Regeln) restriktiv direktiv zu steuern: geht/geht nicht, Gebot/Verbot. Aber die Maßstabsebene, auf der letzten Endes Entwicklung organisiert wird, ist nicht mehr durch diese Einheiten alleine abgebildet.


- Funktioniert Köln/Bonn als ein ‘daily urban system’ für die Menschen oder müsste man die Region nicht direkt mit Düsseldorf und der Metropole Ruhr zusammen betrachten?


Region KB: Wir sind kein starres System, sondern sehr fluide. Man kann sagen, dass das System dadurch anfällig und verletzbar ist. Wir haben mittlerweile gute Erfahrung mit dem Perimeter: Köln und Bonn sind in unserer Wahrnehmung zwei Sendemasten, die eine Pumpbewegung in der Region erzeugen. 80 bis 90 Prozent des Alltages eines jeden Menschen, der hier im 30/40-km-Umfeld wohnt spielen sich in diesem System ab.


Wir sind kein starres System, sondern sehr fluide.


Aus einer markrosystemischen Betrachtung gibt es klar die Rheinschiene und nördlich die Ruhrschiene. Auch bei der Frage der Zentrenfunktionseinheiten haben wir eine ziemlich deutliche Dynamik rund um Köln/Bonn, insbesondere was den Arbeitsmarkt betrifft. Düsseldorf funktioniert vom Grundgefühl eher anders und ist relativ divers, weil es eben die Landesdiktion hat.
In der Region Köln/Bohn beschränken sich die innerregionalen Bewegungen (Wohnen, Arbeiten, Sich Erholen, Kultur, Bildung, Freizeit, Mobilität) auf 45 Autominuten rund um Köln - einem dispersen Gefüge mit über 3,5 Millionen Einwohnern. Das ist eine ambitionierte Koordinierungsaufgabe, da wir ja auch noch reale Projekte begleiten.


- Gibt es bei Ihnen Konflikte zwischen Kern und Peripherie oder, wie im Ruhrgebiet, zwischen schwachem Norden und starkem Süden? Verstehen wir richtig, dass Sie gar nicht die formale Planungsaufgabe anstreben, die z.B. der Regionalverband Ruhr erworben hat?


Region KB: Planungshoheit ist keine Voraussetzung um auf höchstem Niveau zu gestalten. Bei den relevanten Projekten sind wir beteiligt und formulieren die nötigen Schritte horizontal und vertikal mit. Daneben machen wir schon indirekt formale Planung indem wir regionale Strategien effizient zurück in die formale Planung spielen. So ist die Rheincharta offizieller Fachbeitrag des Regionalplans ebenso wie unser Masterplan Grün.
Dies gilt auch für teilräumig ausdifferenzierte Strategien. Mit dem Thema Innenentwicklung gehen wir im Oberbergischen Kreis anders um als in der Kölner Stadtmitte. Wir dechiffrieren also das Thema Innenentwicklung auf einen regionalen Maßstab. Es ist eine Übersetzungsaufgabe, die natürlich auch mit dem Thema Freiraum und landschaftlicher Entwicklung zusammen gesehen wird. All diese Projekte sind ein Beitrag zu einer regionalen Gesamtthematik und einer Strategie. [...]


Conducted by Helmut Thoele and
Matthias Rottmann
30. April Köln

 

Full version of the interview can be downloaded below (PDF)

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INTERVIEW: ''Weiterentwicklung aus der eigenen Identitaet heraus''

VERBAND REGION RHEIN-NECKAR

Christoph Trinemeier ist seit dem 1.10.2007 Leitender Direktor des Verbandes Region Rhein-Neckar. Der Diplom-Ingenieur lebt mit seiner Familie in Landau. 

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VERBAND REGION RHEIN-NECKAR

Christoph Trinemeier ist seit dem 1.10.2007 Leitender Direktor des Verbandes Region Rhein-Neckar. Der Diplom-Ingenieur lebt mit seiner Familie in Landau. Nach seinem Studium der Raum- und Umweltplanung an der TU Kaiserslautern arbeitete er zunächst als Stadtplaner im Planungsbüro Bachtler, Störtz und Partner und wechselte dann über ein Referendariat beim Land Baden- Württemberg in den Staatsdienst. Vor seiner Ernennung als Leitender Direktor des Verbandes Region Rhein-Neckar arbeitete er 16 Jahre als Baudirektor im Regierungspräsidium Land Baden-Württemberg.

 

- Wofür steht die Region Rhein-Neckar?


Die Struktur der Region Rhein-Neckar als eine der elf Metropolenregionen in Deutschland unterscheidet sich von der Struktur anderer Regionen. Die Region ist eine der Jüngeren, eine der Kleineren und aber auch eine der Erfolgreichen. Erfolgreich im Sinne von Konstituierung , Zusammenarbeit und Zielorientierung.


Erfolgreich im Sinne von Konstituierung , Zusammenarbeit und Zielorientierung.


Die ursprüngliche Kurpfalz als zusammenhängender, historischer Kulturraum wurde durch die Alliierten mit dem Rhein als Grenze unterschiedlichen Ländern zugeordnet. Mit dem Nukleus Mannheim-Ludwigshafen ist die Region insofern relativ früh nach dem 2. Weltkrieg sozusagen zwangsläufig in eine Kooperationsstrategie eingestiegen. Das war eine der Grundvoraussetzung für den Prozess, der letztendlich in die Anerkennung als Metropolregion und die Gründung des Verbandes Region Rhein-Neckar mündete. Es bestand eine grundsätzliche Bereitschaft in drei Bundesländern (Hessen, Baden-Württemberg und Rheinland-Pfalz) Zusammenarbeit zu unterstützen, dabei teilweise Kompetenzen aufzugeben und Abstimmungen zu ermöglichen,die sonst ländergrenzenüberschreitend so nicht stattfindet. Dies führte letztendlich zu einem Staatsvertrag zwischen den drei Bundesländern, einmalig in Deutschland, der es erlaubt einen gemeinsamen Regionalplan aufzustellen über Bundesländergrenzen hinweg. Die Anerkennung als Metropolregion wurde parallel s mit der politisch verwaltungstechnischen Fragestellung der einheitlichen Planung und des dafür notwendigen Staatsvertrags vorangetrieben. Diese Zweigleisigkeit ist für die Entwicklung unserer Region entscheidend. Ergebnis ist, dass das Mandatsgebiet des Verbandes der Region RN als Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts deckungsgleich mit der Metropolregion RN ist.. Auch das ist einmalig in Deutschland. Damit ist ein reibungsloser Wechsel zwischen der politischen Ebene des Verbandes Region Rhein-Neckarund der operativen Ebene der Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar möglich, je nach Erfordernis der diskutierten Themen.


- Was sind die wichtigen laufenden Projekte und Prozesse?


Wir haben im Herbst 2013 den neuen Einheitlichen regionalplan Rhein-Neckar fertiggestellt. (Anmerkung: seit 15.12 2014 rechtskräftig). . Die klassischen Themen wie Siedlungsstruktur, Raumstruktur und die sinnvolle Verteilung von Gewerbe- und Wohngebieten sind der Kern des Regionalplans. Infrastruktur als wichtiges Thema konnte nur eingeschränkt behandelt werden, da hier die Kompetenzen auf Länderebene liegen, beziehungsweise durch z.B. den Bundesverkehrswegeplan klare Vorgaben gemacht werden. Der zweite große Themenbereich ist der Freiraumschutz, also überregionale Grünzüge, Schutzbereiche für Forst- und Landwirtschaft, wie auch der Hochwasserschutz. Damit ist der Einheitliche Regionalplan in seiner Struktur inhaltlich keine ’Neuerfindung’. Er lotet vielmehr die Grenzen der kommunalverfassten Regionalplanung aus, die all zu häufig gezwungen ist, den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner als tragfähigen Kompromiss zu suchen.


- Gibt es nach der Aufstellung des Regionalplans schon erste Ideen für die weitere Agenda? Was sind mittel- und langfristig die großen Themen und Aufgaben hier in der Region?


Wir haben kürzlich ein Strategiepapier entwickelt, das die mittelfristigen Themen erfasst und vier Schwerpunkte formuliert: Verkehr/Mobilität, Demographie, Energie und regionale Identität.
Erstens: Der Frage der Mobilität ist eng mit den demographischen Entwicklungen verknüpft. Wir versuchen ein Konzept zu entwickeln, das im Sinne eines Mobilitätsverbundes deutlich über das Thema des „klassischen“ Nahverkehrs hinausgeht. Hieran arbeiten wir gemeinsam mit dem Nahverkehrsträger VRN (Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Neckar), dessen Gebiet jedoch weit über die Grenzen der Region hinaus geht. Wir brauchen nicht nur die Vertaktung und Vernetzung an der Haltestelle, sondern müssen zum Beispiel auch ein gemeinsames und einheitliches Konzept für Car-Sharing und E-Mobility entwickeln und regional integrieren. Hierbei gilt es viele Einzelaspekte eines sehr weit gefassten Mobilitätsbegriffes zu einem vielschichtigen Konzept miteinander zu kombinieren.
Zweitens: Innerhalb des Themas der demographischen Entwicklung gibt es z. B. bei der Anwerbung von Fach- und Führungskräfte verschiedene Initiativen auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen. Es besteht z.B. ein Netzwerk ‚Dual Career’, das Kooperationen vorantreibt zur Karriereunterstützung der Partner der angeworbenen Fachkräfte. Eine andere Initiative wirbt in Spanien gezielt um ausgebildete Fachkräfte für die Region. Selbstverständlich hat das Thema „demographischer Wandel“ auch vielfältige Auswirkungen und Verknüpfungen mit den klassischen Themen der Regionalplanung.
Drittens: Ein weiteres großes Thema ist die Energiewende und die CO²-einsparung. . In diesem Bereich haben wir ein regionales Energiekonzept entwickelt mit Verbrauchs- und Potentialanalysen und einem davon abgeleiteten umfangreichen MaßnahmenKatalog.Wichtiger Bestandteil ist ein Konzept für Windkraftstandorte , das wie andernorts auch kontovers diskutiert wird. Als weiteres wesentliches Thema für die Zukunft wird die Frage der dezentralen Netze (smart grids) behandelt. Hierzu ist auf der Plattform der Region (Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar GmbH) ein Cluster mit Wirtschaftsunternehmen entstanden. Obwohl der entsprechende Förderantrag unter dem Titel ’StoREgio’ leider nicht zum Erfolg geführt hat, wurde das Cluster fortgeführt und es arbeiten nun trotzdem verschiedene Firmen zusammen. Die Komplementarität des Know-how führt zu besseren Lösungen und zur Innovation und technologischen Entwicklung.


Die Komplementarität des Know-how führt zu besseren Lösungen und zur Innovation und technologischen Entwicklung.


Viertens: Die Frage nach der regionalen Identität liegt z.B. dem Masterplan Regionalpark Rhein-Neckar zu Grunde unter dem Titel ’Landschaft in Bewegung’. Der Masterplan soll die Region nach innen zusammenführen und sichtbar machen, Identität schaffen und widerspiegeln, worin die Vorzüge dieser Region als Wohn- und Lebensraum liegen. Wir erschließen beispielsweise die Region für den Binnentourismus, aber auch für externe Gäste durch sog. „Regionalparkachsen“. Diese mit dem ÖPNV verknüpften Fahrradrouten bauen im Wesentlichen auf den Bestand auf, bilden aber ein Netzwerk um die Region als Ganzes wahrzunehmen.


- Sie haben eingangs den ´Metropolenstatus `beschrieben. Welche Bedeutung hat er bei der Gestaltung der vier Themen?


Wir treten insbesondere nach außen als “Metropolregion“ auf und werden entsprechend wahrgenommen. Dabei stehen nicht Einzelinteressen z.B. der großen DAX-Firmen im Fokus sondern Bedürfnisse und Interessen, die für die gesamte Metropolregion RN von Bedeutung sind. Als Metropolregion bekommen Sie keine Fördermittel aus Europa oder vom Bund. Der Metropolenstatus ist vielmehr ein Label oder Zertifikat, das einen bestimmten Raum identifiziert als einen Raum, der bestimmte Funktionen in bestimmter Form bündelt - Stichwort Gateway. Die Anerkennung als Metropolregion dient damit als Vehikel des Standortmarketings. Bezogen auf das Thema der Demographie bedeutet dies ganz konkret: Wir stehen in direkter Konkurrenz mit allen deutschen und auch europäischen Großstädten und Metropolen, unabhängig der jeweiligen Wirtschaftsstruktur. Es geht dabei branchenunabhängig um die besten Köpfe für die Region!


- Nach außen gerichtet eine starke Familie - Gibt es auch Konfliktthemen?


Das Thema Infrastruktur, z.B. der Bau neuer Straßen und Brücken oder die Diskussion um einen möglichen Regionalflughafen sind Beispiele. Dass es hier zu Konflikten kommt ist logisch. Aus Wirtschaftskreisen wird häufig die Bedeutung dieser Verkehrsinfrastruktur für den Standort Rhein-Neckar hervorgehoben,. Die Regionalpolitik und -planung, die immer mehrdimensional und integral sein muss, hat hier die Aufgabe abzuwägen und auszugleichen.


- Der Regionalplan ist im Konsens entstanden und in der Umsetzung direktiv – steuernd?


Wir nehmen auf der Ebene des Regionalplans eine Flächensteuerung vor als ordnende Richtschnur. Die hier festgelegten Ziele des Regionalplans sind für die Kommunalen Planungsträger bindend. Die Zielvorgaben stehen im Einzelfall allerdings auch unter politischem Druck. Am deutlichsten ist dies bei gewerblichen Erweiterungs- oder Umsiedlungswünschen innerhalb der Region, bei denen lokale Egoismen immer wieder eine dominante Rolle spielen. Die Frage der Flächenkonkurrenzen bei der Neuansiedlung großer international tätiger Firmen hat sich aber in diesem Zusammenhang bisher nicht gestellt.


Eine gesunde Konkurrenz zwischen den kommunalen Partnern innerhalb der Region bei Gewerbeansiedlungen ist allerdings sinnvoll und gewollt. Hier halten wir uns als Planungs-Verband zurück.


In der Region geht es vielmehr darum, die großen Standorte attraktiv zu halten und weiterzuentwickeln, auch vor dem Hintergrund der Attraktivität für Fach- und Führungskräfte. Eine gesunde Konkurrenz zwischen den kommunalen Partnern innerhalb der Region bei Gewerbeansiedlungen ist allerdings sinnvoll und gewollt. Hier halten wir uns als Planungs-Verband zurück.


- Bei der Gewerbe- und Standpolitik sind die eigenen Stärken Trumpf, manchmal braucht man jedoch starke Partner. Wie positioniert sich die Region Rhein-Necker im Verhältnis zu Nachbarregionen am Rhein? Sehen sie sich als Konkurrenten oder Partner?


Die Region Rhein-Neckar hat schon relativ lang eine formelle Kooperationsvereinbarung mit der Technologieregion Karlsruhe und dem Verband Mittlerer Oberrhein, also mit dem südlich angrenzenden Nachbarn, seit 2 Jahren auch mit der Planungsgemeinschaft Westpfalz und dem dort angesiedelten Verein für Wirtschaftförderung. Perspektivisch gilt es auf dem größeren Maßstab mit der Region FrankfurtRheinMain und mit der Region Stuttgart zusammen zu überlegen, wie aus einer Kooperation der komplementären wirtschaftlichen Strukturen der drei Metropolregionen Vorteile zu generieren sind. Betrachtet man die drei Regionen nämlich als einen Wirtschaftsraum, so kann dieser theoretisch auf dem Level von Greater London oder Paris in Europa agieren. Wie und ob sich ein solcher Schritt sinnvoll ist wird langfristig zu prüfen sein,, auch vor dem Hintergrund, dass damit die Grenzen des heutigen ‚daily urban system’ mit seinen funktionellen Zusammenhängen weit überschritten werden. [...]

 

Interview
Conducted by Helmut Thoele and Matthias Rottmann
26. March 2014 Mannheim

 

Full version of the interview can be downloaded below (PDF)

 

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INTERVIEW: ''Perfect plans simply matter less''

VERENIGING DELTAMETROPOOL

Paul Gerretsen - chief designer in the fields of regional planning, urban planning and architecture. He has studied at the renowned Universities TU Delft and ETH Zurich. 

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Paul Gerretsen is chief designer in the fields of regional planning, urban planning and architecture. He has studied at the renowned Universities TU Delft and ETH Zurich. He graduated with honourable mention in 1999 at the TU Delft as Master of Architecture.
From 2003 Paul Gerretsen has worked at Maxwan Architects and Urbanists on both urban and regional planning projects. Between 2005 and 2007 Paul Gerretsen was appointed Director of the South Wing Studio for Research and Design of the Province South-Holland. Since 2001 he teaches and lectured at numerous schools and universities.
From 2008 onwards he is appointed director of the Deltametropolis Association. The Deltametropolis Association is a members association that focuses on the development of the Randstad area, consists of the metropolitan area around the four major cities of the Netherlands.

 

- What are the main topics in the Deltametropool in terms of projects and processes?


The key projects and other state-investments programs in the city, which are almost two decades old, are now finally being finished. Examples of this are the big station projects, but also the Rijksmuseum. However by far most of state-investment go into infrastructure and particularly the widening of the roads. Since these projects take a very long time to prepare these investments based on challenges of the past are still dominating the investment agenda for years to come. The key-projects were a big trench of projects that had a strong belief in public, state spending in big projects. Some of them are quite spectacular like the Rotterdam Central Station. The Delta-program is the next big investment program that has significant impact on the way this country and particularly the western, urbanized part, will look like. The Delta-program is directed at water management and water quality and it could have far reaching consequences that we can’t oversee yet. But could be a chance also for other investments to hook onto. What is interesting to note is the absence of state investment into urban areas. Apart from Rotterdam South, there is no central government spending into cities anymore. Redevelopment of cities and strategic investment like for example the Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam are now almost non-existent. Also investment in spatial economic interventions is absent although some changes in policy are appearing. Throughout the 80’s and 90’s, there was quite a large spatial economic policy from the central government in the sub-regions that we are talking about. There was a big shift in Dutch policy, partly because these investments where not effective and partly because the money is being spent on other things at the moment. The FES-fund, income from the gas and oil exploitation in Groningen and the North sea, used to be directed into structural investments of all kind, but has now been stopped as an austerity measure from 2008 financial crises. The income out of oil and gas now flows into the state-budget that can be spent on anything which effectively means it is spent on relieving debt and social security.


- Was that an effect of the economic crisis or a structural political choice?


Both the economic crisis and the political/instrumental shift came at the same moment. It was bound to happen. The concept of using collective income (from oil and gas) for structural investments instead of letting it flow away into anything else, was generally not evaluated very well so was bound to change. Structural changes were unavoidable as other investment, into healthcare and social security where no longer being able to fund without a tax increase. The long term effects of structural investments are harder to pinpoint at the moment. In that sense it is a sign of the time.
Are the Netherlands losing its unique strength of planning?
The change of policies and the end of centrally steered structural funding has evoked a certain dynamic within the Dutch planning system. Formerly strong instruments lost their meaning and part of the strong negotiational structures lost their senses. Of course there are private funds and investors and also decentralized governmental structures, but they cannot cope with the loss of the impact and size of central government spending. You could say that these are marginal in relation to what was spent before.


- What is the role of the association?


The Deltametropool is a independent, non-partisan, members-association of parties that have a stake in metropolitan development. Within the association, there is room for thinking, planning, designing, negotiation and debate about the future of the urbanized heartland of the Netherlands. It is a platform for exchange and to discuss topics on an independent and informal ground, which brings people and parties together without bringing issues immediately into the ‘real’ world.


- Was that also the history of the association?


Historically, the association has always been a place for content, knowledge and debate. It started out at the end of the 90’s as a vehicle of the four major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, Utrecht) to influence the central government policies on the spatial development of the area, but based on a strong will to build on planning concepts. In 1998, a common declaration by the Elderman of the cities marked the official start of the association. Its strategic goal was to strengthen the development of the Randstad into a European metropolitan area with a strong international position. A central term within that declaration is growth. On the one hand, the development of the Deltametropool was seen as part of an ongoing natural growing process which historically started centuries ago.


The development of the Deltametropool was seen as part of an ongoing natural growing process


This process got an extra impulse from the growth of the second half of the 20th century and the start of the EU. On the other hand, growth is also seen as a task to deal with in terms of quality, distribution and complementarity. At that moment, there was also a strong tie between the central government and the cities on the field of spatial planning. They were more or less in line and there was no major conflict. The need for lobbying was less important than the aspect of setting a common agenda driven by content.


- What has changed since then?


Orientation towards spatial challenges was always a very strong driver for the association but the way it was used has changed and needed to change, especially if we think about a new generation of projects. As we discussed in the beginning, most of the projects currently being accomplished were based and developed in the 80’s and 90’s. If we think that we should or could develop a new generation of ‘key-projects’ just the way these kind of projects were developed and prioritized back then, we would follow the wrong path. To work in a structured method towards the type of investment that needs to be done has become very difficult. Next to the economic situation, the steering aspect has changed, so for me, that period has come to a close.


- What are possible reasons?


One reason is the fact that the area has become a city in itself. This aspect – the process of metropolization- is and always has been our key argument. What is different now is that it is less and less a discussion on how we should ‘make’ the Metropolis. It is more about how we can act smartly in a very complex regional and political context and within a social-economic dynamic in which no one can foresee the future developments clearly. That makes it harder for planners to know ‘a priori’ what to do. The things you can be more sure of lie within the bigger themes identified like water levels or demographic change. Within these themes, different kinds of investments will definitely pop up. The emphasis should be on the process to change the way different stakeholders act together. For me, the way we organize the processes to act on decisions for budgets and investments is very crucial. We also see the central government dealing with that question by trying to rethink the way the agendas are currently made. There is the ambition to leave and create more space for integral planning and the involvement of all stakeholders. [...]

Interview
Conducted by Helmut Thoele
15. April 2014 Rotterdam

 

Full version of the interview can be downloaded below (PDF)

 

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LECTURE: Helmut Thöle

"4 Regionen, ein Vergleich"

lecture within the framework of concluding Symposium 'Regions & Projects' of research project Beyond Plan B

comparative analysis of our four partnerregions along the rhine 

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DISCUSSION: Prototypen Regionaler Projekte

within the framework of concluding Symposium 'Regions & Projects' of research project Beyond Plan B

The four parterregions discuss the possibilities and topics of stretegic projects

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DISCUSSION: 4 Regionen, ein Vergleich

Our four partnerreagions react to statements and discuss commonalities and specificities in their approach and context

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DISCUSSION: Regionale DNA vs. McKinsey

within the framework of concluding Symposium 'Regions & Projects' of research project Beyond Plan B

Dr. Reimar Molitor (Region Köln-Bonn) and his colleagues discuss the development of strategic goals for regions 

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Beyond Plan B - Theo Deutinger from Cityfoerster on Vimeo.

LECTURE: Theo Deutinger

''Core and Periphery''

Lecture by Theo Deutinger during Beyond Plan B Symposium in Cologne on 17th of July 2014

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Beyond Plan B - Matthias Rottmann from Cityfoerster on Vimeo.

LECTURE: Matthias Rottmann

''Project Research''

Lecture by Matthias Rottmann during Beyond Plan B Symposium in Cologne on 17th of July 2014

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SYMPOSIUM: ''Regions and Projects"

The symposium ‘Regions and Projects’ focused on the bigger picture of the Rhine-Region and the characteristics and strategies of our partner regions with the aim to link both scales to the results of the research on projects.

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SYMPOSIUM BEYOND PLAN B


Cologne, 17.07.14, 14-18 h, Haus der Architektur

The symposium ‘Regions and Projects’ focused on the bigger picture of the Rhine-Region and the characteristics and strategies of our partner regions with the aim to link both scales to the results of the research on projects.

 

BLOCK 1


Keynote

Frank van Oort

“Economic potentials of the Rhine corridor – myths and realities”

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Input

Theo Deutinger

“Core and Periphery”

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Input

Helmut Thoele

“4 regions, one comparative approach”

 

DISCUSSION BLOCK 1

Helmut Thoele’s input sets the starting point for a discussion of current means in metropolitan development in the four partnering regions. Despite the broad range of issues partners bring to discussion individual concerns clustered around a certain thematic core. All partners describe a significant shift from mainly physical planning tasks with a technical plan as the central instrument to new assignments in the context of metropolitan development.

Significant shift from mainly physical planning tasks to new assignments in the context of metropolitan development.

This shift extends from broadened communication schemes for the idea of metropolisation, up to the adoption of new fields of action, set outside traditional planning agendas, such as education (Rhein-Ruhr). In this shift the orientation on strategic objectives is discussed as a strong hold for metropolitan planning. Flexible approaches are considered to be the means to achieve them. In this process the negotiation of a new balance between formal planning instruments, such as plans and long-term fixed policy guidelines, and informal ones, aiming at communication and a broader legitimation of metropolitan planning, is an important moment.

Related to this re-orientation there is also a quest for a broader involvement on metropolitan planning. Whereas some regional planning organizations seek direct and strong relations to people in the area also in strategic matters (Rhein-Ruhr, Rhein-Neckar); others build on vernacular knowledge of decision makers and seek the feedback of the end users more with regard to concrete projects (Köln-Bonn). However, all participants agree that the region is not ‘one big thing’, but that it is made up by single entities that contribute with their particular qualities to a metropolis.

 the region is not ‘one big thing’, but that it is made up by single entities that contribute with their particular qualities to a metropolis.

As a final conclusion of the discussion stands on one hand the term of the regional DNA, that refers to modes of development, core economic fields, typologies, landscape potentials etc. that have guided processes in a region over longer periods. On the other hand ‘plan b capacity’ is defined as the ability of decision makers to derive valid long-term objectives from these pre-conditions and to achieve them set on adaptable strategies.

 

BLOCK2


Input

Matthias Rottmann

“Project Research”

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Input

Stefan Carsten

“Germany: Future scenarios”

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DISCUSSION BLOCK 2

The discussion readopts current shifts in planning as the central topic. Projects are highlighted as a means to facilitate this re-orientation practically and to establish new structures and objectives. Opposed to the perpetuation of old planning guidelines they can be used to develop new topics and areas of intervention.

Projects are vehicles and catalysts for regional development.

These projects are vehicles and catalysts for regional development, because they help stakeholders to gain a common picture of a region and to elaborate joint planning objectives for it.

Projects stand also for the highly complex organisational patterns in which planning takes place. The professional management and communication of processes is stressed not to be an end in itself, but rather as a means to achieve a high embeddedness of planning projects in their societal context. This is considered an important success factor.

The general increase of bottom-up projects is discussed positively. However, decisive for the success of metropolitan strategies is the effective interplay of different governmental levels, corporative agendas and initiatives. Respectively multi-level governance remains at the core of metropolitan development.

The concluding words clarify that there is no alternative solution apart from the regional one. To achieve the goals of metropolitan development and gain a common understanding on these goals, projects are an important driver. Spatial quality on a bigger scale is gained in these processes by introducing a regional design perspective.

PROFILES OF REGIONS

Beyond the topics brought-up, the different institutional set-ups and conceptions of the metropolitan bodies are reflected in issues they handle and approaches they apply. This also characterises the debate.

The Regionalverband Ruhr builds current policies on the rich history of regional planning in the Ruhr area and a particular strong focus on project making on a metropolitan scale. Structural change and the requirements this brought-up for the physical constitution of the area have been the central fields of action for metropolitan planning earlier. Today the regions socio-economic make-up gains increasing importance as a development aim and is approached in the particular working field of education policies.

 The regions socio-economic make-up gains increasing importance.

In the Region Köln-Bonn metropolitan development rests highly on the capitalisation of the intrinsic potentials of the area and the understanding of it as a highly successful cultural landscape with many small and medium sized urban cores, whose history traces back to Roman times. More recently the region managed to deal positively with the relocation of governmental functions from Bonn to Berlin.

The setting of a metropolitan or rather regional agenda in the Rhein-Neckar-area followed the initiative of companies such as BASF. The regional development agency is also largely funded by companies settled in the area. At the same time it is politically legitimised by all three federal districts it cuts across. In setting regional development aims it acts in the tension between corporative interests and the development agendas of three legitimised governments.

Vereniging Deltametropool operates currently in a situation where planning in the Netherlands, as an effect of governmental cut backs, is stripped down to core tasks. As a result the discussion on concepts, such as the Deltametropolis or the Randstad at decision making levels is currently rather low. In this situation the Vereniging seeks to set impulses for region building by the generation of knowledge and the set-up of concrete projects in the fields of transport-oriented-development and the metropolitan landscape and by initiating a discussion on the character of the metropolis.

 

REPORT: Isabel Neumann

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INTERVIEW: ''Planning the Unknown''

Prof. dr. Stefan Carsten;

Born 1973; Doctorate in geography; from 1997 to 2013 Member of the Daimler Society and Technology Research Group in Berlin; since 2010 Member of raumtaktik - office from a better future. [...]


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PROF. DR. STEFAN CARSTEN
Born 1973; Doctorate in geography; from 1997 to 2013 Member of the Daimler Society and Technology Research Group in Berlin; since 2010 Member of raumtaktik - office from a better future.; key activities in the fields of social science research, urban and mobility research, and social transformation research


- Can you give a short discription of your practice “raumtaktik” and the content of recent research projects mainly “The Baukulturatlas Germany 2030/2050”?

 “raumtaktik” is currently dealing with a project on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB). It is called “Baukulturatlas 2030/2050 in Germany”. It dealt with current and future challenges in terms of new energy structures, the re-thinking social and physical infrastructures and the socio-economic agenda for the coming years. These transition effects will affect land use and will derogate landscape to a high degree. The face of Germany will change significantly in coming decades. One interesting finding was, that we shouldn’t focus on “Baukultur” as a built environment. The “Baukulturatlas Deutschland 2030/2050” attempts to extend this definition of “Baukultur” to be understood not only as built, but as “lived-in environment”. This broader understanding of Baukultur as the lived-in environment refers to processes of appreciation that will be changed through usage, creation and perception. This not only changed the view of the stakeholder that are involved in architectural processes, rather Baukultur is embedded in a holistic, processoriented context.

In terms of findings we had three major topics that we call paradigms. The first paradigm could be adressed as a new agenda for decentralized production regimes.. We think that large industrial clusters and large industrial agglomerations might look completely different or no longer exist in future. Much more decentralized production schemes will come up – a maker economy - and will completely reorganize the way of how we produce and how we consume goods.

The second paradigm is a new understanding of how we create wealth in the future. The current paradigm is more or less framed by the mere focus on economic growth. We understand that there are alternative modes of “wealth-creation-models” to consider. We need to have a closer look at them and ask ourself “How do we perceive wealth? What is quality of life beyond these models? And how do we organize a transformation from one mode to the other?” All of theses questions will gain much more focus in the future. We are not sure whether they will succeed, but they will gain more relevance in the public discourse and their impact on how we organize cities, urban life and economics.

The third paradigm is “What kind of energy infrastructure are we facing?”,  basically, how will new energy landscapes look like. It is dealing with the discussion that we are facing since three or four years. “How will energy be produced? Where will it be produced? How will it come from the source to the consumer?”, and what does it mean for urban and rural spaces: Is there a new agenda of spatial inclusion?

- So, what are the scenarios for this development? Is it obvious what will happen?

We based our findings on three scenarios, which are completely different from each other. These scenarios act as our future reference system that enables to draw consequences for the present. When we deal with the year 2050, there is obviously no idea of how future will look like. It is not possible to have a clear understanding how the year 2050 in Germany, Europe or in the US will look like. We have to gain an entirely different methodological understanding of how we deal with futures. We no longer take trends or prognosis from historical data and transfer or expand them into the future. We have to incorporate speculations. All of them can occur to the same likelihood. And we have to ask ourselves “While we have these alternative futures, what does it mean for the present? How can we deal with all three scenarios and what are robust paths and successful paths for all three scenarios to overcome todays obstacles?” It is interesting to observe that even for very diverse and very speculative scenarios, there are always robust requirements, paths and projects on how to continue. Moreover, we have to implement a very systemic understanding of what the future might be. Only then we are able to de-write our consequences in the present. Future speculations are a great way to learn a lot about the present. 

[...]

 

Interview

Conducted by Martin Sobota

Rotterdam & Berlin

11. June 2014

 

Full version of the interview you can download below (PDF)

 

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Beyond Plan B - Frank van Oort from Cityfoerster on Vimeo.

LECTURE: Frank van Oort

''Economic potentials of the Rhine corridor - myths and realities''

Lecture by Frank van Oort during Beyond Plan B Symposium in Cologne on 17th of July 2014

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PROJECT: Transrapid

Transrapid is a German high-speed monorail train using magnetic levitation. Based on a patent from 1934, planning of the Transrapid system started in 1969. The test facility for the system in Emsland, Germany was completed in 1987.

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Situation

  • The Emsland region is traditionally known to be a poor region in Germany
  • After the oil-crisis in 1973 the German industry was eager to open up new technology and infrastructure. 
  • There was a poor rail link between Berlin and Hamburg after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
  • By that time the argument that the classical railway system was not modern (fast, clean, cheap) enough seemed logic.
  • An argument was to make use of the ‘speed gap’ between trains and planes (700 km/h)
  • French and Japanese High speed systems where growingly succesful. The German industry feared a technological disadvantage.
 
Objectives
  • To research and develop further the idea of magnetic levitation and use this technology to stimulate economic progress.
  • To install a pilot range to also persuade the market of the makebilaty of the Transrapid system.
  • The creation of faster and better connections between Berlin and Hamburg. 
 
Assets
  • Since 1934 Germany owns the patent on a technology based on magnetic elevation.
  • An eager industrial cluster, persuasive key-figures with a good network and a political lobby within a pro-technique society.
  • German spatial and economic structure has ‘target-regions’ for the technology (dense agglomerations + big cities on 200 km distance from each other) 
  • A new transport technology that allows higher speeds and even lower energy consumption and maintenance needs.
  • Strong support within national government and the bigger political parties. 
  • A willing remoted region for the test track. (home of the ‘inventor’ of the technology) with cheap space and interest in an economical impulse.
  • A common believe of all parties that there is a big ‘cake’ to be shared.

Strategy

  • To implement the new technology throughout the country and world (there have been plans to build a Transrapid in Nordrhein-Westfalen, a fast route between Hamburg and Berlin and the most recent one between Munich Airport and its city center)


Actions

  • The “Magnetbahn Transrapid” consortium is formed and work begins on the Test Facility in Emsland in 1978, in 1979 a first test track was shown on the international fair of transportation in Hamburg.
  • 1987 : Completion and commissioning of the Transrapid Test Facility in Emsland TVE.
  • The Hamburg-Berlin line was finally abandoned in 2000. Bavarian politicians decided the Transrapid wasn’t worth the €3 billion new calculations showed it would have cost. The system was sold to China.
  • In 2004, the first commercial implementation was completed. The Shanghai Maglev Train connects the rapid transit network 30.5 km to the Shanghai Pudong International Airport. 
  • In 2006 23 people were killed on the Emsland test track due to a ‘human mistake’. This catastrophe marked the end of political support in Germany.
  • At the end of 2011, the operation license of the Emsland test track has expired, and it has been closed. Early 2012, the demolition and reconversion of all the Emsland site, including the factory, has been approved.

Effects
  • The building of the test range and the planning of the HH-Berlin trajectory created jobs. But not permanently.
  • The estimated effects (of the German government) of the HH-Berlin trajectory of 18.000 jobs during the building phase and the creation of 4.400 permanent jobs did not come out.
  • The end of the test track in Lathen also meant the loss of 60 permanent jobs. 
  • The region now plans a small center for electromobilty on the former site.
  • In a crucial period for the high-speed technology the Deutsche Bahn (DB) invested more money in the transrapid than in the ICE. Critics say that a concentration on one technology would have been better for the German industry and the DB.


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INTERVIEW - "Bescheidenheit und Hybris"

Wirtschaftskrisen, Planung und staatliche Handlungsmacht in historischer Perspektive. Interview mit Tim Schanetzky, Historiker an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena.

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BpB: Herr Schanetzky, in Krisensituationen suchen Menschen nach Handlungsmustern und Erklärungen. Kann man aus wirtschaftshistorischer Perspektive, mit Blick auf die Geschichte von Wirtschaftskrisen, Hilfe leisten?

TS: Hier ist Bescheidenheit angebracht. So verständlich der Wunsch nach einer Positionsbestimmung durch Vergleich und Prognose ist: Empirisch ist die wirtschaftshistorische Rekonstruktion früherer Krisen problematisch, und noch schwieriger sind daraus Schlüsse für Gegenwart und Zukunft zu ziehen. Konjunkturgeschichte beruht schon aufgrund der Datenlage bis weit in das 19. Jahrhundert hinein zumeist auf Schätzungen, oft vor dem Hintergrund einer bestimmten normativen Sicht. Auf einer Zeitachse X können wir zwar bestimmte Momentaufnahmen wie Insolvenzen, Börsenstürze oder Innovationen in den letzten 200 Jahren markieren (LINK ZUM DIAGRAMM) , jedoch ist es empirisch kaum möglich, die Effekte auf der Y-Achse präzise darzustellen oder sie gar zu verallgemeinern. Die jüngsten Erfahrungen unterstreichen überdies, wie verzerrt die Wahrnehmung von Krisen ablaufen kann. Schauen Sie auf den Zusammenbruch von Lehman Brothers. Er löste zwar eine Panikreaktion aus und setzte eine weltweite Kettenreaktion in Gang, stand aber entgegen der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung nicht am Beginn der eigentlichen Krise. Schwierigkeiten auf den Immobilien-, Hypotheken- und Rohstoffmärkten hatte es schon anderthalb Jahre zuvor gegeben, und auch die Konjunktur befand sich im September 2008 längst im Abschwung. Wissenschaftliche Berater warnten schon 2007 vor einer weltweiten Bankenkrise.

BpB: Inwieweit können uns Theorien über wirtschaftliche Zyklen helfen, das Gesamtbild besser zu verstehen?

TS: Wir können sicher einen idealtypischen Krisenverlauf beschreiben, der immer wieder zu beobachten ist: Krise bezeichnet dabei den häufig schockartigen Wendepunkt am Ende einer Hochkonjunktur, die bereits von starken wirtschaftlichen Ungleichgewichten wie Preisblasen oder Kapitalmangel geprägt ist. Oft wird dieser Umbruch vom Vertrauenslust an den Finanzmärkten ausgelöst. Darauf folgt ein Abschwung, ein unterer Wendepunkte, ein Wiederaufstieg, schließlich eine erneute Hochkonjunktur, so dass sich insgesamt eine zyklische Wellenbewegung ergibt. Über die Bestimmung der genauen Form dieser Wellen und ihrer Ursachen wird aber seit je gestritten. So wird zum Beispiel zwischen Konjunkturzyklen mittellanger Dauer (Juglar-Zyklen), kürzeren Investitionszyklen der Unternehmen (beschrieben durch Kitchin), Lebenszyklen von Wirtschaftssektoren und technologischen Innovationszyklen unterschieden. Kondratjew hat sogar Wellenbewegungen zu erkennen geglaubt, die ein halbes Jahrhundert umfassen (LINK ZUM DIAGRAMM). Zudem gibt es Modelle, die versuchen, die Relation von Wirtschaftswachstum und Einkommensverteilung zu beschreiben (Kuznets).

BpB: Inwiefern sind aus theoretischen Modellen wie diesen denn überhaupt konkrete Schlüsse zu ziehen?

TS: Genau diese Schwierigkeit ist ja derzeit mustergültig zu beobachten. Die meisten Presseartikel, Essays und Bücher fragen, in welchem Abschnitt eines idealtypisch verstandenen Krisenablaufs wir uns im Moment befinden. Und auch die Marktteilnehmer – Sparer, Investoren, Regierungen – schätzen ihre Risiken anhand dieser Überlegung ein. Weil die Lage aber unklar ist, folgen daraus Unsicherheiten. Politik kann Entscheidungen unter Verweis auf Unsicherheit jedoch nicht aus dem Weg gehen, und wo Experten noch die Widersprüche ihrer Modell gewichten, entscheidet sie notgedrungen pragmatisch. Allen Unsicherheiten zum Trotz beruhte ja nicht nur die deutschen Krisenpolitik von 2008/9 auf einer recht verbindlichen Interpretation der Lage: Sie ging davon aus, dass der konjunkturelle Einbruch vom energischen Gegensteuern der Notenbanken und Regierungen gedämpft werden konnte. Es ging um eine antizyklische Reaktion, die das Vertrauen wiederherstellen und zugleich die Konjunktur stimulieren sollte. Das galt nicht nur für die Bankenrettung, sondern auch für ebenso unerprobte Instrumente wie die massive Ausdehnung der Kurzarbeit oder die auf die Automobilindustrie gerichtete Abwrackprämie. Hinter ihnen stand die Hoffnung, dass der historisch außergewöhnliche Einbruch der Exporte nur von kurzer Dauer sein würde.


ZUM VERHÄLTNIS VON POLITIK, WIRTSCHAFT, WISSENSCHAFT UND PLANERN


BpB: War das Zusammenspiel von Staat, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft zu anderen Zeiten einfacher?

TS: In der Tat, in der Bundesrepublik der 1960er und frühen 1970er Jahren glaubte man, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung systematisch planen und präzise steuern zu können. Diese Globalsteuerung wollte die Extreme der konjunkturellen Schwankungen abfedern und die Konjunktur insgesamt im positiven Wachstumsbereich verstetigen. Diese Machbarkeitseuphorie prägte damals alle gesellschaftlichen Bereiche und war sowohl in der westlichen Hemisphäre als auch im Ostblock auszumachen. Basis dafür war die Erfahrung der Wiederaufbaukonjunktur nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, die in Ost und West zu großen Wohlstandsgewinnen geführt hatte. Spätestens mit dem Ölpreisschock von 1973 folgte darauf jedoch die große Ernüchterung. Im Kern ging es darum, dass sich wissenschaftliche Prognosen als unzuverlässig erwiesen und eine eindeutige und widerspruchsfreie Lageanalyse in der Praxis unmöglich war. Und selbst wenn die Lage aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht eindeutig war, verhielten sich Politiker nicht so rational und uneigennützig, wie sich die Technokratietheorien das ursprünglich vorgestellt hatten. Dies ist die eigentliche Geburtsstunde eines Handlungsmodells, das uns wohlvertraut ist: Marktregulierung. Den Anfang machte die monetaristische Geldpolitik. Die Diskussion darüber begann nicht bei Reagan oder Thatcher, sondern unter Willy Brandt. Und umgesetzt wurde der neue Kurs erstmals von der Bundesbank im Frühjahr 1973.[...]'

 

Interview

durch Helmut Thöle und Matthias Rottmann am 01 Juli  2013 in Essen-Steele.

 

Full version of the interview you can download below (PDF)

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INTERVIEW: Boris Gehlen

Dr. Boris Gehlen

Born in 1973. Studied constitutional, social, and economic history; political science; and modern history in Bonn. Currently a research fellow at the University of Vienna.



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Dr. Boris Gehlen

Born in 1973. Studied constitutional, social, and economic history; political science; and modern history in Bonn. Currently a research fellow at the University of Vienna.

Keywords

Criteria for legitimacy / Ideal circumstances vs. political feasibility / Relationship between the economy and the state / Continual necessity of making fine adjustments

Focal points of the interview

Actors and players on the sides of the state and the corporations

Economic history perspective on the Rhineland and entire river basin

Spatial effects and bases of various economic-spatial identities, for example, Rhine capitalism

- "We would like to begin with an observation from the last National Urban Development Congress in Mannheim on the theme of "Trade in the City – The Role of Industry." It was evident that the representatives of industry that were present have withdrawn from any discussion and public position on the relevant themes, such as local politics and conditions for competition. Do you have an explanation for that?

I believe that such questions are addressed on an entirely different level; they are not aired publicly. The discussion presumably takes place hidden in the local spaces, that is to say, in the form of informal conversations between companies and the department heads at the local level. Representatives of industry usually only involve themselves in public or political discourse in the form of generally synthesised statements."

- Is that not somewhat paradoxical in view of the fact that there is an intense debate regarding participation and the involvement of citizens? Is it not the case that the desired transparency is difficult to achieve given such a process?

That appears to me to be normal in the case of political processes. The earlier a project is made publicly known, the more likely it is that there will be critics; there are critics in the case of any project. For those people who are largely in agreement with regard to the justifiability of a project, it can be correspondingly more valuable to stake one's claims from the outset and identify resistance.

Basically, the search for and demand for transparency in political planning processes lead to a greater lack of transparency in the beginning of these processes. But in the final analysis these are in particular informal planning spaces that to a very great extent are inaccessible to historians.

- Does this mean that such projects are therewith inaccessible to a comparative economic perspective?

That is difficult to judge. Normally the local usefulness on the demand side is evident. Whether this will lead to an economically efficient solution is a question that only becomes particularly relevant in the case of large projects such as airports or exhibition halls. This is a consequence of the lack of congruency between economic spaces and organisational spaces. This can automatically create other kinds of logic.

Thus one could argue that the new Berlin airport, as an international connection point for Berlin industry, has positive effects (and is therefore desired by the municipality), but from the point of view of national economic policy a third or fourth international hub does not appear to be necessary.

- If one considers the playing field for organisational spaces and economic spaces historically, have there historically been clear lines and demarcations between industry and politics?

If we think of the development of the industrial cities of the Ruhr region, then development there was very clearly driven by the companies. The companies settled there at a point in time at which cities as organisational spaces did not yet exist. They have only come into existence through the massive industrialisation of the space since 1850. In industrial cities such as Leverkusen, Ludwigshafen, or Wolfsburg, the city administrations were, if one sees it maliciously, an extension of the companies. On the other hand, the state has also attempted to harness private companies for its purposes. A good example are the railroad networks or communication networks, for the construction of which private financing was used to a certain extent. These private investments, however, were regulated by the state – particularly with regard to secured profit guarantees. The motivating factor at that time was already, as it is today, a tight budget situation that more or less excluded the possibility of complete state financing.

This raises a central question: What incentives does the state offer to private investors, and how can the state guarantee that on the one hand processes of spatial concentration are not intensified to such an extent that they produce social costs, and on the other hand ensure that all areas are supplied with infrastructure? That is the classical problem of infrastructure networks: There are always areas and lines that are highly lucrative, while for the most part it is not possible to recover the costs of investment in the medium or indeed in the long term in rural regions.For this reason it is necessary to find instruments so that private-sector parties can contribute in the interests of the state. As an example one can take the discussion regarding the availability of broadband connections in rural areas. There are cases in which local companies and communities have wanted to participate in the expansion of telecommunications networks in rural areas. This is comparable to the approach in earlier processes for the construction of telegraph networks in the nineteenth century. However, this is today blocked by EU procurement guidelines (impermissible subsidising of individual companies).[...]'

 

Interview

Conducted by Helmut Thoele and Matthias Rottmann on 12 July 2013 in Cologne.

 

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Stimuleringsfonds Creative Industrie

Der Stimuleringsfonds Creatieve Industrie aus den Niederlanden unterstützt Beyond Plan B mit Projektmitteln aus der Teilregelung ‘Städtebau + Ökonomie’.  

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